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In this paper, the perspective of situated cognition, which gave rise both to the pragmatic
theories and the so-called semantic theories of learning and has probably become the
most representative standpoint of constructivism, is examined. We consider the claim of
situated cognition to provide alternative explanations of the learning phenomenon to those
of psychology and, especially, to those of the symbolic perspective, currently predominant
in cognitive psychology. The level of analysis of situated cognition (i.e., global interactive
systems) is considered an inappropriate approach to the problem of learning. From our
analysis, it is concluded that the pragmatic theories and the so-called semantic theories
of learning which originated in situated cognition can hardly be considered alternatives
to the psychological learning theories, and they are unlikely to add anything of interest
to the learning theory or to contribute to the improvement of our knowledge about the
learning phenomenon.
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En este artículo se examina el punto de vista de la cognición situada, que da origen
tanto a las teorías pragmáticas como a las llamadas teorías semánticas del aprendizaje
y que se ha convertido, probablemente, en la posición más representativa del
constructivismo. Nuestro análisis intenta profundizar en la pretensión de la cognición
situada de proporcionar explicaciones al fenómeno del aprendizaje alternativas a las de
la psicología y, especialmente, a las que se dan desde una perspectiva simbólica,
dominante en la psicología cognitiva. Se constata, también, que el nivel de análisis de
la cognición situada, el de los sistemas globales interactivos, es inapropiado para abordar
el problema del aprendizaje. De nuestro análisis se desprende que las teorías pragmáticas
y las llamadas teorías semánticas del aprendizaje derivadas de la cognición situada
difícilmente pueden constituirse en una alternativa a las teorías del aprendizaje
desarrolladas en la psicología e, incluso, se pone en duda que puedan aportar algo de
interés a la teoría del aprendizaje y contribuir, así, al desarrollo de nuestros conocimientos
sobre el fenómeno del aprendizaje.
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Ever since the eighties, a current of thought about the
dynamics of the acquisition and use of knowledge, which
has been called situated cognition, has gained predominance
in the field of philosophy, and particularly in philosophy of
education. An approach to learning developed from this
epistemological current, which is usually considered
pragmatic, and which is known as situated learning. For
reasons that will be understood later on in this paper, this
viewpoint has even allowed some authors to defend what
they call semantic learning theories and to set them up
against the psychology viewpoints, which they classify as
being unsemantic. All these supposed learning theories,
whether they are called pragmatic, situated, or semantic, are
characterized by their emphasis on the importance of the
interactive and psychosocial situations in which learning
takes place—which, as will be seen, winds up ignoring the
fact that learning is an individual phenomenon. The
immediate result is that the equation of learning and
acquisition of knowledge becomes blurry. Therefore, some
proponents of situated cognition offer explanations about
learning that they consider alternatives to the clearly
cognitive viewpoint currently predominant in psychology,
in which learning is clearly identified with acquisition of
knowledge. The aim of this article is to argue against this
vindication of situated cognition to set itself up as an
alternative to psychology and to show how its contribution
to the progress of the learning theories is highly improbable
due to the deficiencies of its analysis.
The viewpoint of situated cognition has been incorporated,
under the label of social constructivism, into a whole blend
of ideas, which in the field of education are grouped under
the global term of constructivism1, and which include, among
others, Piaget’s (1970, 1970/1971) genetic epistemology and
some notions from cognitive psychology. Piaget’s theory has
sometimes been presented as an alternative to cognitive
psychology and, more specifically, to symbolic theories (see,
for example, Pascual-Leone, 1980). However, as situated
cognition is probably the most original contribution within
what some writers consider constructivism, in this article,
we reflect on situated cognition in particular and not
constructivism in general. Had we chosen the second
alternative, it would have been necessary to address the
analysis of different and sometimes contradictory viewpoints,
which would probably have led to some confusion2. 
On the other hand, no matter what constructivism is,
authors have sometimes attempted to set up supposed
constructivist learning theories against so-called information-
processing theories, ignoring the fact that the label
information-processing theories seems to include everything
in psychology that is known about learning. It is therefore
important to clarify what these constructivist theories claim
as their own and which might be important enough to
become an antagonist or alternative standpoint to the
explanations of learning provided by psychology. Again,
after a careful scrutiny of the literature on constructivism,
it seems obvious that, except for some excesses that do not
deserve further attention, the only approach that could
disagree with the psychological explanations is precisely
the approach of situated cognition. This is another reason
for undertaking a detailed examination of the possible
contributions of situated cognition: to clarify whether
constructivism in general and situated cognition in particular
are really an alternative standpoint to psychology. 
We would like to note that not all the constructivist
learning theories from the educational field are presented
as always being incompatible with cognitive psychology.
But that is probably worse because then, as stated by
Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1996, p. 5), “some educational
opinion, including opinion that is quite contrary to the body
of empirical evidence available on these matters, is presented
as deriving from cognitive psychology.” Therefore, it is
preferable for this kind of doctrine to declare itself an
alternative to cognitive psychology so that some element
that might contribute to the progress of learning theories
could be detected in this declaration of incompatibility. 
The Nature of Situated Cognition
Situated cognition starts out from the overvalued fact
that knowledge processes depend on context, more
specifically, on the interaction between the individual and
the context. This overvaluation turns both the context and
the interactions taking place in it into determining factors
and, sometimes, into unique factors to explain the dynamic
of these processes. Thus, the phenomenon of learning could
only be understood within the specific contexts in which it
is produced, so that, according to this viewpoint, there can
hardly be transfer from one context to another. The
immediate consequence is that, for situated cognition, as
previous knowledge—which mobilizes an individual to cope
with a new experience—is the result of prior experiences
CONSTRUCTIVISM, SEMANTIC LEARNING THEORIES AND COGNITION VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL… 181
1 Although some authors treat constructivism and situated cognition like two independent movements (see, for example, Seel, 2001),
we have opted, like many other authors and for efficacy, for classifying situated cognition within the constructivist movement, despite
—as mentioned in Footnote 2—it could be classified in what some authors understand as constructivism in a separate movement. 
2 Steffe and Gale (1995) differentiated up to six different paradigms that coexist within constructivism: social constructivism, radical
constructivism , social constructionism, information-processing constructivism, cybernetic systems constructivism, and the sociocultural
approach of mediated action. Some of these so-called paradigms are actually variants of situated cognition.
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and was therefore generated in other contexts, is ultimately
somewhat irrelevant to explain the formation of new
functional units of knowledge, which are developed from
that same experience and which, when all is said and done,
are the result of learning. Therefore, people’s available
knowledge is, at any rate, not as important to explain
learning processes as their interaction with their environment. 
As there is some consensus in psychology, in the sense
that the representation of knowledge is of a symbolic nature,
the underestimation of the role of “knowledge in the mind”
involves the rejection of the symbolic theories, because, by
means of these theories, researchers try to explain how the
available knowledge in peoples’ minds determines the mental
operations they perform. From the viewpoint of artificial
intelligence, for example, this implies that, according to
situated cognition, the traditional approach—which assumes
that the reuse of the existing symbolic descriptions is the
main tool on which intelligent activities are based—should
be modified. Seen from another point of view, according to
some versions of situated cognition, knowledge accumulated
in an intelligent system, such as, for example, the human
mind, does not determine the nature of the operations that
the system performs, because the contexts in which the
knowledge is generated are unrepeatable, so that knowledge
originating in one context is not usable in another. Thus,
the concept of representation, so central to cognitive
psychology, loses its power and, according to situated
cognition, research should focus not so much on describing
knowledge in the mind, but rather on the nature of the
system’s interaction with the environment, starting with the
system’s goals, which, in turn, are generated in that
environment. This way leads to extremes that are impossible
to accept, according to which knowledge is not “inside an
individual’s skin” (Agre & Chapman, 1987; Lave, 1988;
Suchman, 1987) but instead, outside, as a result of the
person’s interaction with the environment.
Situated cognition has inherited a broader, functionalist
and pragmatist, philosophical trend regarding human action.
From this trend, people and their physical and social
environments are envisaged as a function of the contribution
of both environment and persons to an activity that takes
place conjointly, and not as separate entities that can be
independently described. This interaction leads to
synchronization between persons and their environment that
is not based on possible comparisons between the world
and subjects’ internal representations, but that implies a
mutual dynamic modification. It is just this interactive
(Bickhard, 1992), relational (Lave & Wenger, 1991), or
dialectic (Clancey, 1992) conception that has comprised the
nucleus of the work carried out in situated cognition and
that gives rise to the pragmatic theories of situated learning. 
One of the consequences of this standpoint is the
difference of perspectives between cognitive psychology
and situated cognition. Whereas cognitive psychology
attempts to explain processes and structures at the individual
level, situated cognition focuses on global interactive
systems, so that, at the individual level, their analyses only
lead to the description of the trajectories resulting from the
individual’s participation in certain environments. For situated
cognition, people’s knowledge is not only in their heads—
if it can be said to be there—but instead it consists of the
way that people interact with other people and with the
situations they cope with. 
In turn, this difference leads to another difference in the
approach. Psychology tends to carry out molecular analyses
in order to understand how the more elemental processes
make sense and are the foundation for more complex
processes. On the other hand, situated cognition tends to
perform molar analyses, attempting to deal with problems
directly, in all their complexity. For situated cognition,
people’s knowledge about the world is too extensive and
complex to be identified and manipulated with the correct
amount of detail. Furthermore, according to situated
cognition, the world is such a complicated and changing
place that people can hardly deal with it using previously
established mental representations, when it is precisely the
study of the dynamic of mental representations what allows
one to carry out analyses at a molecular level. 
For situated cognition, it is simply impossible to observe
all the relevant aspects of cognition in depth. It is like going
back to the fifties, when researchers were arguing about the
viability of the scientific study of the mind, a discussion
that was sidestepped by the progressive consolidation of
cognitive psychology. From our viewpoint, we would like
to note that, in some cases, the insufficient development of
psychology has certainly sometimes caused some important
problems to escape molecular analysis. However, as stated
by Baddeley (1976) with regard to psychology of memory,
to adopt a molar o globalizing approach to phenomena that
are difficult to analyze molecularly is often just a way of
running away which involves the risk of making the very
problems it tries to analyze unmanageable. 
In an effort to synthesize and to limit our study to
learning-related topics, one could say that, apart from the
general aim of setting itself up as an alternative to
psychology, the theoretical viewpoints adopted by situated
cognition are important for two reasons. On the one hand,
because they point to a problem, no doubt complex, about
how learning is the result of the interaction of people with
their environment, either social or physical. On the other
hand, in much more applied way, because the proposals of
situated cognition have been expressed in some learning
methods of the teaching field. 
With regard to the first point, we first should determine
exactly what this kind of viewpoint really contributes to our
understanding of the phenomenon of learning. This is not
a simple question because, given the fields of knowledge
where situated cognition originated— basically philosophy
and social sciences—its statements lack the rigor of other
domains (such as that of psychology, where theories are
generally formulated with enough precision to be confirmed
by scientific methods such as the experimental method) to
offer some guarantee that they are really contributing to the
progress of our knowledge. In fact, as will be seen below,
both the research methods of situated cognition and the
conceptual frameworks it deals with derive from fields such
as philosophy, ethnography, discourse analysis, symbolic
interactionism, or the sociocultural theory and therefore, it
is difficult to elaborate experimentally contrastable theories.
Consequently, and in a first approach, we can expect little
from the contribution of the analyses of situated cognition
to the progress of the theories of learning. 
With regard to the second point of the teaching methods,
situated cognition is decidedly education-oriented, so that
its strength consists of proving the efficacy of its analyses
in the application to teaching situations. However, it must
be acknowledged that the issue of the teaching methods
transcends mere applied interest. The reason is that research
on the acquisition of knowledge merges with research on
the technologies that support and extend human cognitive
processing (Hmelo & Narayan, 1995). However, for this
type of research to bear fruit, it must be based on conceptual
frameworks that are scientifically accessible, so that, once
again at this point, an effort must be made to clarify the
proposals of situated cognition.
In order to fulfill this goal of clarifying the viewpoints
of situated cognition, we decided to go back to its origins
and foundations. By means of this strategy, a more detailed
dissection of the arguments of this current of thought can be
made, so as to analyze the nature of the possible contributions
of situated cognition to our conceptions of learning. 
The Sources of Situated Cognition
The ideas that merge and give essence to situated
cognition have very diverse origins, although the philosophic
notion of transactionalism is probably the driving notion on
which the entire conceptual body rests. Other ideas have
joined this notion, from different fields that, for some reason
or another, were present in education. At this point, we would
like to point out that situated cognition did not originate
within psychology, but rather with regard to the problems
of education and other social research fields. Therefore, it
cannot be analyzed within the context of the progress of the
conceptions of learning in psychology. So, in order to unravel
all this mixture of ideas that merge in situated cognition, we
are going to group the sources of influence into three large
blocks: philosophy, Vigotski’s (1978) sociocultural theory,
and ethnography. Although in an exhaustive analysis, one
would have to also consider other influences such as
discourse analysis of linguistics, or Gibson’s (1979) ecological
theory of perception. We consider the contribution of these
fields to be minor or, to a great extent, coinciding with the
former; hence, they are not taken into account. 
Philosophy
The main ideas that nourish situated cognition are
probably to be found in philosophy. To sum up, these ideas
could be classified into three groups, numbered by order of
importance: first, Dewey’s (Dewey, 1942; Dewey & Bentley,
1949) transactionalism; second, Ryle’s (1949) distinction
between knowing what and knowing how; and third, the
digression about the semantic and the syntactic, originating
in Searle’s (1980, 1983, 1984) work.
Regarding the first group is Dewey (1929, 1942), a
functionalist philosopher who, along with his master, Peirce,
assigned himself the role of founder of pragmatism, and
who had an instrumentalist conception of knowledge, in the
sense that he conceived ideas as tools used by people to
solve problems encountered in their interaction with the
environment. He even went into the field of psychology of
his times, dominated by behaviorism, criticizing the notion
of the reflex arc. For Dewey, whom some consider a “social
behaviorist,” the reflex arc should be understood linearly
and, in consonance with his ideas, although not very
successfully, he proposed a circular reflex arc that would
better reflect the interaction of organisms with their
environment (Dewey, 1896).
He coined the conceptual framework of transactionalism
(Dewey & Bentley, 1949) to address a whole series of
phenomena of interaction between the individual and the
environment, among which those of an educational nature and,
therefore, concerning learning, are noteworthy.
Transactionalism, which is the key concept both in situated
cognition and in what has been called social constructivism
and social constructionism, is based on a metaphor of an
economic transaction. When a piece of merchandise is sold,
from the viewpoint of the seller (or from that of the buyer
when something is bought), there is no established price, but
instead the price is fixed in the course of a negotiation. That
is, the context in which factors such as the buyer’s need to
buy or the seller’s need to sell, and the scarcity or abundance
of the product merge and lead to fixing a price. For example,
from the buyer’s viewpoint, some changes are produced both
in the individual and the environment, which, in this case,
mainly comprises the seller. If we translate this analysis into
learning, then learning does not start from a fixed
representation, but, just as the price is generated as a result of
a negotiation, a functional unit is generated which is the result
of the interaction between the individual and the environment,
and which comprises the content of what is learned. In this
sense, certain changes take place as a result of the interaction:
in the learner, the effects of the acquisition, and in the learner’s
social environment, the effects of participation. 
This explanation, which smacks of commercial matters,
leads to the so-called pragmatic learning theories, among
which situated learning is the most representative. The
important point is that this view points to some issues that
have become more problematic in the last few years. 
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First, it should be acknowledged that learning processes
are influenced by the context in which learning occurs and,
consequently, it should be conceded that people’s mental
activity must be contemplated in relation with the problems
of their environment, which is mainly of a social nature.
However, as will be seen below, it is not clear whether the
virtue of transactionalism consists of merely limiting itself
to indicating the problem or somehow contributing to its
solution. However, psychology has made considerable
progress in this direction, both in the specific territory and
in what could be considered a more general one. As to the
specific, because ever since the work of Newell and Simon
(1972), carried on by Anderson (1976) or Rosenbloom and
Newell (1986), among many others, the dynamic of
knowledge has been seen to be at the service of problem-
solving behavior and can therefore only be understood, in
a sense, within the framework of the problems presented
by the environment. As to the more general sphere, because
also in psychology, a research program has begun, embarking
on studies at a rational level of analysis to attempt to show
how the environment sets up the type of mental activity that
people carry out (see, for example, Anderson, 1990, 1991).
Second, the idea that learning only occurs naturally
within the framework of social interaction has led to what
some authors have called psychosocial learning theories.
The problem with these theories is that their emphasis on
the social processes that take place in group interaction
situations leads them to neglect the individual learning
mechanisms that take place in these same interactive
situations, so that ultimately, individual learning is ignored.
The undesirable result of this state of things is that these
psychosocial theories do not show us how people learn. The
only consideration that links psychology to this type of
theories is of a motivational nature. As has been repeatedly
demonstrated, in some circumstances, people seem more
motivated to learn in interactive situations than in individual
learning situations but it is not possible to know how they
learn as a result of these theories. Also, while not forgetting
that these analyses are clearly incomplete from the viewpoint
of motivation, the immediate consequence is that the problem
of learning is reduced to the motivation to learn. Obviously,
in order to reduce learning to a purely motivational issue,
one only has to observe the product of learning and discard
the processes. In favorable motivational situations, such as
learning in interactive groups, the product must be
quantitatively and qualitatively better. Although the processes
that take place in the group are usually described, the
processes by which group members learn are not clarified.
Ultimately, these psychosocial theories are a return to far-
off and completely outdated periods, because they adopt a
viewpoint like that of the former behaviorists, who insisted
on the need to study the changes in the results of learning
but ignored the processes by which these changes took place.
In the old times, this attitude could be justified because
researchers did not have the pertinent intellectual and
methodological instruments. Nowadays, however, this kind
of neglect is only justifiable in people who are not familiar
with the field of learning.
Third, and regarding the above, the concept of
transactionalism has, more or less aptly, been used to
describe the mechanisms by which social and cultural
changes take place and to attempt to understand how
individuals contribute to social change. Unfortunately, this
natural ranking of transactionalism within “social issues”
and its subsequent involvement in “individual issues” has
created some confusion between what could be called “social
learning” and what in psychology is understood as learning,
which is essentially individual.
Fourth, it has also been used to explain that meaning is
not fixed, but the result of a negotiation that takes place
within an interactive framework. But transactionalism also
runs into problems here, basically because its pronounced
tendency towards the sense sometimes obscures Frege’s3
distinction between sense and reference (Frege, 1892). And,
primarily, it precludes the analysis of the problem of the
relations between sense and meaning.
Finally, from transactionalism, an attempt has been made
to build a global theory about the sense of human action,
whose evaluation exceeds the limitations of this article.
However, when analyzing the sense of human action at a
global level suitable for philosophy, the individual’s
psychological processes tend to be overlooked or, what is
worse, described in a language that does not permit their
detailed analysis and, in the end, they are ignored.
A philosophical theory of human action should explain
how it transforms the environment and the people
themselves. In this context, the person’s intentions, motives,
and goals must be considered. That is, the sense of human
action. All this leads to a pragmatic interpretation of human
action. From this point of view, transactionalism may be a
fertile framework for this type of phenomena. But it is not
clear if it is also useful to analyze the phenomena of learning,
as the defenders of situated cognition claim. 
Both in psychology and in artificial intelligence, the
initial analyses were excessively structural, focusing on
purely formal aspects because of the difficulties of the
researchers’ enterprise. The force of the experimental data
gradually revealed the insufficiencies of the formal, or purely
syntactic, analyses and gave way to a more dynamic and
interactive view of an intelligent system’s functioning,
3 Frege, considered the founder of analytic philosophy, would be at the antipode of Dewey’s pragmatist functionalism, more related
to the biologist viewpoints and those derived from social Darwinism.
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focused on more semantic aspects. Some time ago, from
cognitive psychology, Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and
Thagard (1986) called for a reorientation toward more
pragmatic interpretations of learning. These authors did not
hesitate to acknowledge that this reorientation had already
occurred in the work of Anderson (1983), Mitchell (1982,
1983), and Rosembloom and Newell (1986), who explored
how knowledge could be generated and used within the
framework of problem-solving behavior, or in the work of
Johnson-Laird (1983), another distinguished defender of
symbolic theories, who showed that the mental models are
transitory constructions of the environment that guide the
processes of human inference. At this point, regarding these
new conceptions of learning, one wonders whether these
changes in cognitive psychology were the result of the
analyses proceeding from transactionalism. Probably, the
answer would be “no.” 
However, transactionalism has had a crucial influence
on situated cognition, not only providing the basic ideas on
which it is founded, but also transmitting the type of
language and methods of query and reflection suitable for
philosophy. This involves the risk of turning situated
cognition into an umbrella for some versions of learning
that cannot resist a detailed analysis. For example, consider
the fact that people’s goals are implicit in any human activity
and, of course, in learning. But we wonder whether learning
depends directly on the kind of mental operations people
perform in the course of their goal-directed problem-solving
behavior or, in a hasty generalization, on the intentionality
generated by their interaction with the environment. In the
latter case, one would have to acknowledge that, ultimately,
intentions are what produces changes in knowledge. In fact,
experiments carried out already several decades ago, in
which learning occurring in intentional situations was
compared with that occurring incidental learning situations,
showed that the intention of learning does not affect learning
(see, for example, Nelson, 1976).
From its very origin, the transactional viewpoint is
closely linked to education, which, in turn, can lead to some
misunderstandings, also as a result of some generalizations.
A learning problem in educational settings can sometimes
be mistaken for a problem of learning theory. For instance,
education has sometimes been accused of trying to make
students learn contents that make no sense to them and
which, as a result, they do not learn. This is doubtless a
serious problem for education. However, its analysis exceeds
the limits of this article. But it is not a problem for learning
theory. The fact that a learning theory must explain the role
of goals in learning processes does not mean that it must
determine the goals of learning in education, or that a
reflection about the goals of education can turn into a
learning theory. 
Another possible source of confusions should be noted.
For a learning theory derived from transactionalism, the
transformations produced in the individual are as important
as those that take place in the environment as a result of
human action. However, what individuals learn is not the
same as what collectives of persons or societies learn. To
unravel the problems of what we have called “social
learning” is a task for sociologists or anthropologists. In a
sense, societies could be said to learn and build a culture
but, in any event, the processes by which they “learn” should
not be mistaken for the processes by which individuals learn. 
Generally speaking, the interaction of individuals leads
both to social and to individual learning, but the result of
learning is not the same in society as in the individual. The
nature of this “social learning” result—where is it, what is
it like, and by what mechanisms is it used—exceeds the
boundaries of a psychological learning theory. However, it
seems obvious that, in individuals, the result of learning
must somehow be represented in their minds and whatever
has been recorded in their minds is used on later occasions.
Naturally, the concept of mental representation cannot be
applied to the result of social learning, and therefore, one
must resort to functional units whose definition, once again,
is the task of sociologists or anthropologists. On the other
hand, as education can be considered a culturalization
process—a process in which children assimilate the culture
of the society in which they live, reconstructing the culture—
, it is a field in which individual learning is often confused
with social learning. To sum up, denying the virtuality of
mental representations makes sense in social learning but
not in people’s individual learning, unless, in a display of
intellectual distortion, one denies the existence of individual
learning and reduces everything to social learning. 
With regard to the second point, Ryle (1949) introduced
the distinction between knowing what and knowing how.
According to this philosopher, knowing what is knowledge
that describes the way the world is, whereas knowing how
is knowledge about how to do things. Knowing how is usable
knowledge. Contrariwise, knowing what is inert knowledge
that is only good for being stated. Ryle, who was also
interested in education, thought that the failure of institutional
teaching was due to its emphasis on transmitting knowing
what, which is knowledge that is not directly usable. Hence,
the senselessness of the educational practices. 
Ryle’s (1949) distinction was incorporated some time
ago into psychology in the analyses performed on learning,
but not because of Ryle’s direct influence, but as a
consequence of the development of psychological learning
theories, starting with the primitive works of Newell and
Simon (1972), Newell (1973), and Anderson (1976). In
psychology and artificial intelligence, knowing what is known
as declarative knowledge, which is knowledge that describes
the way the world is, whereas knowing how is called
procedural knowledge. In computer sciences, it would be
like the difference between data and processes. 
Among the many declarations of situated cognition about
cognitive psychology, is the accusation that cognitive
psychology underscores knowing what knowledge. Namely,
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according to situated cognition, psychology considers
knowledge to be something conceptual, fixed, and inert, due
to some hardening of the mental representations. Yet, indeed,
only from cognitive psychology can the meaning of
declarative knowledge—how it is used and how it
contributes to the acquisition of procedural knowledge—be
understood. 
The psychological analyses of the nature of declarative
and procedural knowledge allow us to understand their inter-
relation, why people have declarative knowledge, and how,
from declarative knowledge, people acquire procedural
knowledge, which is the only really useable knowledge. In
fact, it also allows us to understand the tendency in education
to transmit only declarative knowledge, an extreme that is
at the core of Ryle’s (1949) criticisms of institutional
education. The reason is that, as procedural knowledge is
highly automatized, people are aware of their declarative
knowledge, and therefore, when they try to teach their
knowledge, they tend to think in declarative knowledge.
Lastly, one can understand why the persistence of education
in teaching declarative knowledge reinforces the much
criticized “transmission model.” Declarative knowledge is
the only knowledge that can be stated or declared and,
consequently, the one that is the most apt to be transmitted
to a supposedly passive learner. 
The absence of a scientific analysis of Ryle’s (1949)
considerations has led to a strange paradox that is found
in some versions of constructivism in education. The
paradox starts with a strong rejection of the “transmission
model” and of teachers’ erroneous preconception that
students are passive learners. However, at the same time,
teachers are led to believe that what they should teach is
declarative knowledge, regardless of the use to which such
knowledge is put, namely, unrelated to the procedural
knowledge which it could produce. All this ultimately
promotes the “transmission model” whose very criticism
was the starting point.
Fortunately, situated cognition does not share this
approach coming from other versions of constructivism,
according to which knowledge is reduced to declarative
knowledge. However, it is symptomatic that, Ryle’s (1949)
contribution does not lead to a reflection in situated cognition
on the nature of these two types of knowledge, but instead
it only takes note of his warning about the importance of
the use of knowledge. For situated cognition, knowledge
could be redefined as the skill to behave interactively with
the environment. In this sense, it would not be the sum of
concepts and relations inside a person’s head. That is, it
would not be of a declarative nature. In its origin, knowledge
would be fruit of exchanges between individuals and their
environment and, consequently, it would only be useable in
the same context in which it was learned. Therefore, it is
characterized by some unrepeatability which we will come
back to later. For the time being, suffice to say that such
unrepeatability leads to ignoring the existence of declarative
knowledge. If knowledge is unrepeatable, why bother storing
something that cannot be used in the future?
This lack of considering declarative knowledge leads to
an insufficient image of how learning takes place. From
situated cognition, it is impossible to understand why people
have declarative knowledge and what its function is within
the system. In some versions of situated cognition, people’s
declarative knowledge is understood as a subproduct or
residue of their problem-solving activity. Brown, Collins,
and Duguid (1989), for example, propose that, in educational
situations, students should acquire declarative knowledge
by a process of reflection about the procedures they already
master. Regarding this contempt for declarative knowledge,
it is one thing for the problem of education to consist of
having limited itself to transmitting declarative knowledge,
but to ignore the existence of this kind of knowledge and
its function within the system it is quite different. Declarative
knowledge is certainly inert if taken by itself, but we all
know that Paris is the capital of France, tables have legs,
and dogs bark. What we should try to do is to explain how
this knowledge can be used and what function it fulfills in
our problem-solving behavior.
As situated cognition does not study in depth the
distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge,
some of its versions may not explicitly deny the existence
of declarative knowledge. In this case, it only states that
declarative knowledge depends on the context, in the sense
that it can only be used in the context in which it was
learned. The point is that declarative knowledge, for example,
conceptual knowledge, is relatively independent of the
context and precisely therein is its virtuality. In any case,
in the explanations of learning by situated cognition,
declarative knowledge is ultimately ignored. 
With reference to the third point, Searle (1980), a
philosopher initially oriented towards linguistic philosophy,
underlined the differences between computers and the human
mind. In his famous “Chinese room” example, an English-
speaking man going from side to side of a room, following
the instructions of a computer that simulated a Chinese-
speaking person, could give the impression to an external
Chinese-speaking observer that he knew Chinese, when in
fact he did not know the meaning of any of the Chinese
symbols he was dealing with. With this example, Searle
wished to point out the fact that computers display intelligent
behavior, although radically different from peoples’ behavior,
because the symbols used by computers have no meaning.
For Searle (1980, 1983, 1984), the intelligent operations
performed by computers only obey syntax, so these
operations can be characterized as purely formal. But the
operations performed by the human mind are based on
representations that have meaning and are consequently
defined by their semantic nature. 
Although Searle cannot be actually ranked within
situated cognition or Dewey’s (Dewey, 1942; Dewey &
Bentley 1949) transactionalism, his emphasis on the
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difference between the syntactic and the semantic and his
attempt to situate psychology in the syntactic sphere—
leaving semantic matters in the hands of the highest bettor—
have frequently been used to support the viewpoint of
situated cognition, while devaluating the viewpoints of
cognitive psychology. Situated cognition is clearly oriented
towards the problem of sense and believes that meaning
and, ultimately, the sense of human action, can only be
grasped by the exchanges with the environment, because
the sense is generated in the framework of these exchanges.
Probably, nobody will object to this viewpoint. However,
when this view is stressed by referring to Searle’s arguments
in the attempt to establish an alternative to cognitive
psychology, then some problems arise.
In the first place, some confusion arises about the
aforementioned old distinction between sense and reference.
When stating that the symbols that computers use lack
semanticity, it can mean that they have no referent. It can
also mean that computers have no sense and that it is the
user who provides the sense, but this involves other issues
that will be commented on hereafter. When referring to the
first meaning of the semanticity of symbols, it should be
made clear that, although the symbols used by computers
lack meaning, the psychological theories of learning do not
deny the semanticity of mental representations. Moreover,
the work of Marr (1982) has even demonstrated that the
semanticity of mental representations originates in perception
and one could speculate about the possibility that the
symbols used by computers lack semanticity simply because
computers lack perceptive organs. 
Ultimately, the problem lies in knowing whether the
nature of the operations carried out by an intelligent system
can be different because of having or not having meaningful
representations. If so, the task would consist of explaining
how semantics determines syntax. None of these two aspects
of the problem has been seriously addressed or solved. The
semanticity of mental representations can certainly affect
the nature of mental operations, but what really should be
explained is how a syntax of such a radically different nature
could emerge from this semanticity. Lacking such an
explanation, any consideration of this sort is mere assumption
and consequently, of no value. Therefore, to point out this
difference between computers and the human mind is a mere
anecdote. In Linguistics, for example, where a similar issue
—the relations between semantics and syntax—has been
debated ad nauseum, no solution has been found. Briefly,
in this field, it seems that the only possible solution is to
resort to Pragmatics to explain how meaning depends on
the context and the speaker’s intentions and, therefore, the
only way to understand “what the speaker wants to say” is
to take these factors into account. That is, an explanation
is provided that everyone has in mind, but using a relatively
sophisticated language. Unless, of course, the context and
the speaker’s intentions are precisely defined, and from that
definition, one can understand how the context and the
speaker’s intention can determine the meaning. In the applied
field, for example, the sterility of these analyses has checked
the development of a computer program than can simply
translate a discourse from one language to another. 
As mentioned, Searle’s (1983) reflection also pointed
out that the behavior of computers lacks sense. This is
because computers have no goals or, ultimately, intentionality.
As computers are physical systems that manipulate symbols
and, according to the symbolic theories, so is the mind, these
theories are accused of identifying computers with the mind
and, in a hasty deduction, the conclusion is reached that in
the symbolic theories that are typical of cognitive
psychology, there is no place for goal-directed intentional
behavior.
This is not the right place to examine in detail the
insufficiencies of this argument. Suffice to say that the
symbolic theories have been able to develop explanations
of goal-directed behavior that are supported by a large
amount of experimental data. On the other hand, to state
that both the human mind and the computers display
intelligence because they are both physical systems that
manipulate symbols cannot lead to the naivety of declaring
that, if this is so, then the mind is like a computer and,
therefore, it lacks intentionality. Some time ago, it was
speculated whether the so-called “computer metaphor” of
the mind could be considered a strong or a weak metaphor,
in an attempt to decide to what extent the mind could be
identified with a computer, or in what way. This speculation
is not very fruitful, especially if we do not understand what
is meant when declared that the mind, like the computer4,
is a physical system that can manipulate symbols. From the
viewpoint of research on the functioning of the mind, it
would be interesting to decide whether the functional
architecture of a computer can inspire our theories of the
mind. At the start of cognitive psychology, an affirmative
viewpoint of this possibility was adopted. It is probably in
this sense that one could argue about whether the computer
is a strong or weak metaphor of the mind. The current issue
is exactly the opposite: The scientists who develop computers
are inspired by what psychology knows about the functioning
of the mind. In this sense, it would be more suitable to refer
to “the metaphor of the mind.”
The main problem about Searle’s (1980, 1983, 1984)
speculation is the aforementioned one about many analyses
proceeding from philosophy and which consist of the use of
abstract terms that lack an operational referent. Many authors
agree that terms such as intentionality, comprehension, or
4 A description of the nature of the physical systems of symbols may be found in Newell (1980) or, more recently, in Newell,
Rosenbloom, and Laird (1989).
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semanticity may belong to this category of abstract terms
lacking a clear referent. The issue of intentionality, for
example, has become very popular in some philosophical
circles where they argue heatedly about this mysterious
characteristic, supposedly only possessed by the human mind.
The point is that intentionality is never defined with precision.
In general, philosophers usually talk of aboutness (which
could be understood as “something about something”), that
is, for philosophers, intentional behavior is behavior that
refers to something. For example, if we say “a sunset is
beautiful,” we are referring to something, and in this sense,
it is intentional. Thus, in philosophy, intentionality is usually
linked to sense and meaning. However, at a more concrete
level, intentionality could sometimes refer to people’s beliefs
and desires, other times to goals, and even to awareness of
the goals, or probably to other things as well. 
When analyzing Searle’s (1983) writings, it seems as
if intentionality or meaning were some sort of hidden
substances secreted by the human brain. Some time ago,
Pylyshyn (1980) used a jocose argument to respond to
Searle’s obsession with computers and his Chinese room
metaphor. He said, let us imagine that technology advances
so far that it can substitute a person’s injured brain cell
with a pill or chip, programmed to maintain the same input-
output function of the injured cell. If we progressively
substituted more and more cells, there would come a time
in which the person would go on talking correctly, but he
would not know what he was saying; that is, he would have
lost the capacity to understand the meaning. What external
observers would understand as words would only be sounds
produced by circuits for that person. Naturally, some
philosophers do not accept this joke because for them,
intentionality—that property of persons that they are
incapable of defining—would be an attribute of the mind
and not of the brain, but then, we would be entering the
risky assumption of the mind-brain duality, whose discussion
exceeds the limits of this article. 
Fortunately, Searle is not a dualist, so many ask him the
following question: How can one decide whether or not a
system has intentionality when in both cases, they have
functional isomorphism; namely, they both do the same
thing? Searle’s (1984) answer is that every person in
particular knows that we have a mind and that our mind is
intentional and we suppose that the same thing occurs with
everyone else, simply because we are made of the same
stuff. Robots, computers, and other similar creatures, at least
for the time being, are made of a different stuff and,
consequently, we cannot assign them this characteristic of
intentionality. Searle’s argument does not seem very
conclusive. In the Chinese room metaphor, where a person
blindly follows some instructions without knowing the
meaning of what he is doing, we could add several persons,
or even stupid beings that, by following instructions, would
make the system work. It is not clear whether such a system
is different from any normal person. Especially, if we think,
like Harman (1989), that “Our brains work as they do
because they are full of tiny little organisms (brain cells)
that stupidly follow certain limited principles!” (p. 838).
This is not an attempt to deny the presence of some
unsolved problems in psychology through the reflections on
intentionality or consciousness. But we cannot rule out the
possibility that the entity of these possible problems derives
precisely from their lack of definition. Anyhow, the
interesting point is that when situated cognition assumes
Searle’s arguments, this adds more confusion to its own
stance and, when attempting to present itself, using those
same arguments, as an alternative to the symbolic theories
of psychology, it makes both positions incompatible. The
undesirable result is that the somewhat globalizing analyses
of situated cognition, which might be correct, lose their
possible efficacy by not being complemented with the more
rigorous analyses proceeding from cognitive psychology. 
Vigotski’s Sociocultural Theory
In the twenties and thirties of the 20th century, Vigotski
(1934/1962, 1978) established a developmental theory
within the framework of a broader conception of human
action. This conception, known as the activity theory and
which was also developed by other authors, such as Luria
(1976) or Leontiev (1978), attempted to explain the origin
of consciousness from what they understood to be a Marxist
perspective5. The essential idea is that individual
consciousness would emerge as the fruit of social
interaction, which, in turn, is supported by language. We
cannot refrain from establishing some parallelism between
this stance and Skinner’s (see Lowe, 1983), with which we
do not disagree6. It is not a question of denying the
virtuality of the activity theory to explain the origin of
consciousness, but rather of examining whether some
analysis that would contribute to explain the phenomenon
of learning may derive from this theory. 
Surprisingly enough, this conception about human
activity shares some points with Dewey’s (Dewey, 1942;
Dewey & Bentley, 1949) transactionalism, which has turned
it into one of the main references of situated cognition. At
this point, we note that another important developmental
theory, Piaget’s theory—which also claims to be of
constructivist nature—, cannot be considered transactionalist
because of the minor role assigned to the environment in
5 For a reflection on Marxism and psychological theories, see Aparicio (1986).
6 Some clues to this identification may be found in Aparicio (1991).
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ontogenetic development. Coming back to Vigotski
(1934/1962, 1978), developmental growth can be analyzed
at several levels. Leaving aside the madurative and
phylogenetic levels, the most developmental level, the
ontogenetic, or macrogenetic, level occurs through an
internalization process of interindividual exchanges. 
Vigotski’s (1934/1962, 1978) explanations about the
internalization process, although diffuse, have some
noteworthy merits. For Vigotski, internalization does not only
refer to what could be understood as the static content of
learning, but also to the internalization of the very processes.
That is, in the course of interactive problem-solving, not only
is the solution to the problem internalized but also the process
by which it is solved. Seen from this angle, the problem
proposed by internalization has led to research of the meta-
cognitive aspects of learning, which has doubtless implied
significant progress in our knowledge of learning, although
probably not directly through Vigotski’s influence. On the
contrary, especially when seen from an educational
perspective, internalization can be contemplated as a
culturalization process, with the resulting risk of blurring the
distinction between “social learning” and individual learning.
According to Vigotski’s theory, in this internalization process,
language—which has the function of regulating thinking—
plays a major role (as with Skinner, 1974, 1984), becoming
the link between the interpersonal and intrapersonal spheres. 
A parallelism is postulated between this ontogenetic, or
macrogenetic, level, and another one, the epigenetic level,
which Vigotski (1978) called the microgenetic level and
which corresponds with individual learning. Thus, along
with other developmental theories such as Piaget’s, this
theory shares the claim that it can explain people’s individual
learning in similar terms to those that supposedly take place
in developmental growth. In contrast, it is noteworthy that,
as the explanations about development provided by some
developmental theories are based on dubious developmental
stages, cognitive psychology tends to invert the strategy and
to explain ontogenetic development in terms of individual
learning, considering children as universal novices. 
At the microgenetic or individual learning level,
Vigotski’s (1978) theory postulated some mechanisms similar
to those postulated at the ontogenetic development level, so
that learning would consist of the internalization of social
processes of an interactive nature. One of the most
noteworthy characteristics of the explanations of learning
derived from the Vigotskian model is its generality. Although
the advantage of these general analyses is that they make
the lay person feel that he understands how learning is
produced—which is probably why they have been successful
in some educational circles—however, they have the
tremendous drawback of validating some interpretations of
the phenomenon of learning that, at the very least, could be
described as extravagant. 
Thus, for Vigotski (1978), like developmental growth,
learning takes place in a social context and is the result of
social interaction. Naturally, Vigotski does not deny the
possibility that individuals may solve problems by
themselves—although, obviously, he does not say how—
but he states that there are some difficulty levels where
problems may be solved cooperatively, but not individually.
Vigotski calls this the zone of proximal development. This
notion, which plays an essential role in his explanations of
the process of ontogenetic development, is also essential in
the explanations at the microgenetic level. Progress in
learning takes place through the changes produced in this
critical zone. On the other hand, as these changes are the
result of social interaction, then this interaction is produced
in the aforementioned proximate development zone. In a
teaching situation, for example, teachers should make an
effort to interact with their students in this zone if they want
them to learn, but the teachers can also enhance interaction
between the students, who presumably share the same critical
development zone. The interaction of a child with an adult,
or of the beginner with the expert in the case of learning,
is, in principle, not so beneficial because their respective
zones of proximal development are very unbalanced. At a
deeper level, this inequality can be understood as more than
the mere difference in the quantity or nature of knowledge.
It is an inequality that is due to the difference in meaning.
That is, the zones of proximal development are different
insofar as the subjects’ type of problems and goals are also
different. In his analysis of the mediation of language in the
process of development, for example, Vigotski (1934/1962)
points out that the child and the adult share the reference
before they share the meaning. 
Intuitively, to understand the zone of proximal
development in terms of sense is somewhat attractive.
However, from an experimental perspective, there are certain
difficulties to define with some precision the differences
between the possible “senses” in order to predict in which
zone of proximal development a subject is. Perhaps for
situated cognition, this is not a real problem because there
is ultimately the possibility of making holistic considerations,
but we should acknowledge that if one attempts to study
the topic in depth, either for any kind of research or to apply
this notion, for example, to educational settings, this lack
of definition effectively prevents the idea of proximal
development from bearing fruit.
Sometimes Vigotski’s (1978) concept of proximal
development has been combined with Piaget’s idea of
conflict. This combination has produced the notion of
sociocognitive conflict, in an effort to explain how learning
takes place when an experience comes into conflict with
the available knowledge, but only if this occurs via a social
interaction in a certain critical zone of proximal development.
This reformulation is illustrative because it also stumbles
upon the lack of definition of the notion of zone of proximal
development. However, when introducing the Piagetian
notion of conflict with preexisting knowledge, the analyses
take on a more cognitive and less psychosocial quality and
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then, when these analyses are applied to educational settings,
what is ultimately left is the old yearning, present in teaching
for decades, of defining what knowledge is required to be
able to acquire new knowledge. Namely, what is known as
the prerequisites of learning. Moreover, the very idea that
conflict can produce learning is only sustainable when it is
formulated very generally. For example, in the field of
research on conceptual change, where it has been profusely
mentioned, this idea has been revealed to lack explanatory
power (see, for example, Rodriguez Moneo, 1999) and is
quite dubious that it can describe the mechanisms of
conceptual change (see Aparicio & Rodriguez Moneo, 2000).
Vigotski’s (1978) sociocultural theory is clearly
transactional and has therefore become one of the
foundations of situated cognition. Learning is understood
as a product of social interaction and, consequently, strongly
dependent on context. However, Vigotski’s contribution to
situated cognition goes beyond its synchronization with the
transactionalist viewpoint. Concretely, its explanatory model
allows the detailed examination of two characteristic aspects
of situated cognition regarding teaching. In the first place,
the roots of the difference between everyday knowledge and
academic knowledge or, in other words, between naïve and
scientific knowledge. Second, it contributes to the
development of the idea, already present in transactionalism,
that learning is generated in group interaction situations. In
some versions, the possibility of learning by oneself is even
denied, which, as will be seen, poses numerous problems. 
With regard to the first point, learning takes place in the
context of real life and is, in principle, learning between peers,
which means it is produced in the same proximate
development zone. The nature of this learning would
consequently be the result of some co-participation in the
goals and type of problems to be solved. A theory about
human activity may be able to explain why people learn what
they learn as a function of the context in which they learn.
The point is whether it can explain how people learn what
they learn, which would be the object of a learning theory.
As we shall see, there is, in fact, a flagrant lack of ideas about
the learning mechanisms that occur in real life situations,
which derives from the assumptions of situated cognition.
Regarding group learning, the notion of zone of proximal
development is also essential because, as mentioned, the
efficacy of learning between peers is based on the fact that
such learning takes place in the same proximal developmental
zone. But is this explanation is sufficient? As noted, the
notion of proximal developmental zone may be relevant to
describe the nature of social interaction, but not to build
thereon a theory of group learning processes. In fact, the
enthusiasm with which the field of teaching has greeted the
efficacy of cooperative learning is parallel to the lack of
guidelines about its possible practice, except, of course, those
guidelines of a motivational nature, based on the structure
of the incentive (Slavin, 1995). Moreover, despite the
unconditional approval that some teaching spheres have
expressed for this method, the corresponding research does
not seem to have shown its efficacy conclusively (Druckman
& Bjork, 1994). Actually, we lack adequate analyses that
would allow us to understand how people learn in groups.
Except for the dubious aforementioned explanations about
the role of conflict in groups of peers, there is only one well-
known learning mechanism left, extensively studied in
psychology, consisting of elaboration (Slavin). The elaboration
that is enhanced in group situations is of a very secondary
nature, such as when the group is not exactly a peer group
and some members teach others. As has been frequently
shown, when individuals try to teach another person, they
force themselves to elaborate their own knowledge, which
enhances their own progress or learning. 
As with Dewey’s (Dewey & Bentley, 1949)
transactionalism, what must be determined about Vigotski’s
work is whether an alternative learning theory from the one
provided by cognitive psychology can be derived from a
theory of human activity. In the case of Vigotski, the
trajectory is somewhat more complicated because from a
theory of human action would derive a developmental theory
from which, in turn would derive a learning theory.
Ethnography
Until the beginning of the 20th century, ethnography,
which focused on the study of the inhabitants of the
European colonies of Asia and Africa, was merely
descriptive. But Malinowski (1961/1922) began to query
about the meaning of the cultural practices of these supposed
barbarians. The tale of how Malinowski transformed the
field of social anthropology is a long one and exceeds the
limits of this article, but it is important to remember that
Malinowski carried out a work in the search for meaning. 
Mead (1928) soon picked up the relay in a study on
adolescence in Samoa that can be considered the first
monograph on educational ethnography. Although some
doubt has subsequently been cast on the sources from which
Mead reached her conclusions, the Malinowskian methods
of Margaret Mead were first applied to the investigation of
teaching by Spindler in Stanford and afterwards by Kimball
in the Teachers’ College of Columbia. Later on, Stenhouse
transferred the assumptions of educational ethnography to
England. 
The important thing from this current of thought, which
proposed the use of qualitative research methods, is that its
main goal was to reveal the meaning of educational
exchanges. Among the important findings of this type of
focus is the analysis of the tacit contents that are transmitted
in education, which are technically called the hidden
curriculum. However, the limitations of the qualitative
research methods, together with the inherent subjectivity of
the interpretative focus in this kind of theoretical perspective
led to a dead end that, nonetheless, caused some concern
for the meaning of teaching to be maintained.
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As of the end of the seventies, some anthropologists,
among them Lave (1988), once again took an interest in
education from the ethnographic view in an attempt to unveil
the meaning of educational practices. This investigator’s
strategy consisted of establishing the differences between
daily or informal knowledge and academic or formal
knowledge. The idea is that most school activity is produced
in the context of a relatively closed culture that has nothing
to do with the culture underlying the activity that takes place
in people’s daily lives. Thus, the purposes and the meaning
of the exchanges that take place in real life are completely
different from those that occur at school. The problem of
meaning, inherited from ethnography, merges in Lave’s
approach with the transactionalist perspective via the
influence from Vigotski’s sociocultural theory (see Rogoff
& Lave, 1984). Thus, Lave has become one of the most
qualified representatives of situated cognition. 
According to Lave (1977) , the most important thing
is that the way people learn at school is different from the
way they learn in real life. In both cases, the context is
the determinant factor. Therefore, there seems to be a
notable lack of transfer from one situation to another. For
example, in a study by Lave (1988) on the behavior of the
clients of supermarkets from Orange County in California,
she observed that the clients’ academic level in math did
not correlate with their capacity to calculate the best price.
That is, the estimation of whether it was better to buy a
17-ounce can of tomatoes at 30 cents or a 25-ounce can
at 41 cents requires somewhat complicated fraction
operations that the supermarket clients master, but it has
nothing to do with what they learned at school about
operations with fractions. 
Moreover, Lave (1988) discovered some interesting inter-
relations. For example, she verified a strong correlation
between income level, knowledge of academic mathematics,
and academic level, but none of these variables were related
to the ability to select the best price at a supermarket. The
relation between income level and academic level has been
repeatedly demonstrated ever since the classic work of
Comber and Keeves (1973), although it was subsequently
refined, in the sense that the correlation only appeared in
middle classes, but not in the less favored ones.
Anyhow, the correlation between income level and
knowledge of academic mathematics, and the lack of a
relation between academic and everyday knowledge, led
Lave to some excesses, not lacking interest, according to
which academic mathematics are only good for defining the
class structure of the American society. This lack of meaning
of teaching led her to conclude that academic mathematics
are as arbitrary and irrelevant as Latin and Greek were in
past generations, which would explain why there is no
relation between knowledge of academic mathematics and
the ability to select the best price at a supermarket, despite
which the relation persists between the academic and the
income levels. 
In another well-known study of Carraher, Carraher, and
Schlieman (1985), street children from Recife (Brazil) were
observed to be capable of performing complicated
mathematical operations in the course of their sales on the
street, and they also verified that this skill was not transferred
to school. In these and other studies, these two types of
skills are shown to co-exist independently. This has led
Brown et al. (1989) to distinguish between an authentic
activity and a school activity, which is not authentic and is
characterized by being unproductive from the perspective
of useful thinking. 
In order to understand what authentic activity is, we go
back to Lave’s study of consumer behavior. In this situation,
there are other factors that intervene and determine buyer
behavior, for example, the quantity of a product needed
depending on the size of the family or how near a certain
product is on the supermarket shelf may determine a more
expensive sale. Thus, the buyer’s decision is determined by
the context, where many factors interact. 
Lave (1988) used this framework of analysis to
understand the behavior of “normal people” in their daily
activity. Her studies reveal the large difference between the
activities and the culture that provide meaning and goals to
what students learn in real life and at school. Specifically,
regarding the very processes of learning, Lave thinks that
there is a notable difference between the way people learn
at school and the way they learn in real life. When people
want to learn something, there are two options. First, to
adopt the classic role of the apprentice who tries to learn
from what others do, by interaction with them. To adopt
this apprenticeship role does not involve a qualitative change
of what “normal people” do, so the behavior displayed by
apprentices is very similar to that which takes place in real
life exchanges (Lave, 1977). A second alternative is to sign
up for a course or become a student at a school. In this case,
the general strategies of intuitive reasoning, problem-solving,
and negotiation of meaning developed by people during
their daily activity must be substituted by other strategies
that are more appropriate to solve clearly defined problems,
formal definitions, and precise manipulations of symbols.
It is probably difficult to object to anything in Lave’s
(1988) viewpoints regarding the difference in meaning
between real life and school exchanges. However, her views
on learning are a different matter. To say that the learning
of an apprentice is more efficient than the learning that takes
place at school is not very useful unless one actually
demonstrates that the former is effectively more efficient
and, if so, unless one finds out how the apprentice actually
learns. To know this, one must investigate the processes
displayed by the learner in this type of situations and not
restrict oneself to what could be called motivational
considerations. As the learning processes from daily life are
ignored in situated cognition, it is symptomatic that when
applying situated cognition to the field of education, these
processes are not enhanced, but instead they try to make
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the academic situations as similar as possible to daily
situations in the hopes that if the situations are the same,
the learning will be equivalent. 
At this point, readers are reminded of a historical event
that may illustrate what we mean in this discussion. Skinner,
a pioneer in transferring the findings from psychology of
learning to education, proposed applying to teaching the idea
that learning is produced as a consequence of reinforcement
(Skinner, 1974). Actually, it seemed as if he was applying a
learning theory to education. However, when cognitive
psychology began to focus on learning, the researchers
became aware of the fact that reinforcement was more a
question of motivation than of learning (Kintsch, 1977).
Learning that takes place in instrumental or operant situations
can certainly be considered learning, if it is understood that
subjects learn the relation between their behavior and the
consequences derived from it. But if, as in the case of
Skinner, we ignore this theoretical intermediation and simply
say that learning is the product of reinforcement, then we
are talking about motivation, not learning. This is similar to
the case of situated cognition that, in its rather globalizing
analyses, does not clarify what is learning and what is
motivation to learn. Moreover, whereas in Skinner’s case,
his contribution to motivational theories—and, in a sense,
to learning—is clear, the same cannot be said about situated
cognition. Perhaps an additional work could be carried out
to attempt to analyze what situated cognition contributes to
the theories of motivation, parallel to this article about its
contribution to the theories of learning. 
Situated Cognition and Cognitive Psychology
In the previous section, we attempted to dissect the series
of ideas that merge in situated cognition and to examine the
extent to which some of them are relevant to the analysis
of the phenomenon of learning. The lack of rigor of some
formulations of situated cognition may lead to confounding,
for example, a problem of learning with an educational
problem; a problem of learning with a motivational problem;
or a problem of social learning with an individual learning
problem. In addition, situated cognition has frequently
attempted to define issues against the assumptions of
cognitive psychology. This has led to rather simple views
of the standpoint of cognitive psychology, which we have
attempted to clarify. 
In fact, rather than lack of rigor itself, situated cognition
uses a different level of analysis from that of cognitive
psychology (Greeno, 1998). According to Greeno, a
mathematician and enthusiast of learning and, currently one
of the greatest defenders of situated cognition, the level of
analysis of situated cognition is that of global interactive
systems and, consequently, it starts out from the kind of
models of human activity proposed by Dewey (Dewey, 1942;
Dewey & Bentley, 1949) or Vigotski (1958). This level may
be useful to analyze phenomena related with systems of
socially organized activity and it may be the most appropriate
to address the problem of the sense of human action. Hence,
its arrival on the scene of the problem of meaning. In
contrast to this level of interactive systems is the level of
analysis of cognitive psychology, which could be defined
as that of individual cognition. What we are trying to defend
here is that the phenomenon of learning belongs at this level,
which is held by cognitive psychology.
These two levels of analysis do not have to be
contradictory; they could even be complementary. The
problem arises when, from a certain viewpoint of analysis,
one attempts to address issues that are impossible to address
from that viewpoint. This does not mean that the findings
at one level cannot contribute to a better understanding of
the findings at another level, as long as this communication
does not involve the invasion of one field by the other. And
not because the competencies of the different disciplinarian
fields must be salvaged, but because conceptual systems
and theoretical frames of reference are generated about a
certain type of problems and to analyze certain phenomena.
Unless reference frames from other fields are imported with
some rigor, the result is a whole series of misunderstandings
and inconsistencies that have already been discussed. 
For example, education is an applied activity that poses
many problems. One of them is individual learning and
another is the meaning of education. The issue of the
meaning of education, which is a philosophical problem,
could be expressed by the question: what use to our students
is what we teach them? This problem refers to the goals of
teaching and can undoubtedly only be addressed from an
analysis that takes into account human activity within the
framework of a socially organized interactive system. To
attempt to solve the problem using explanations from a
learning theory is a bit absurd, although a learning theory
could contribute somewhat to clarify some extremes. In the
example we discussed above, the consideration that
declarative knowledge is not directly useable whereas
procedural knowledge is, may help to delimit the problem. 
Furthermore, in the description of situated cognition with
regard to education, it seems as though this current of
thought finds itself incapable of solving the problem—the
sense of teaching—for which it is supposedly equipped and,
instead, is trying to turn it into a learning problem. It would
therefore not be a question of knowing whether what we
teach makes any sense to our students but to try to lend it
sense by contextualizing learning. This way of looking at
things leads to a teaching strategy that has found some favor
among educators. An interactive theory of human action
states that if we manage to design a meaningful context for
our students, learning will ultimately be meaningful, and if
the context is realistic, the resulting learning will be used
because the corresponding transfer is guaranteed. Once again,
it seems we are facing a motivational problem. However,
from the perspective of a learning theory, the issue is to
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know how learning process can be facilitated in certain
motivational conditions and to know the transfer limits and
possibilities of what is learned. 
The possible achievements of situated cognition in posing
some interesting problems are obscured by the nature of its
analyses of learning, which are somewhat naïve or, to use
the above-mentioned argument, which use conceptual
frameworks that are not very appropriate to analyze the
phenomenon of learning. Our opinion is that it would be
necessary to arrive at some convergence of these two
approaches, which would entail adopting a common
language, a task made difficult because of the intellectual
roots of situated cognition. 
Fortunately, situated cognition has gone into less
speculative fields, such as artificial intelligence (Agre &
Chapman, 1987; Clancey, 1992), where some specific
problems have arisen such as the man-machine interaction;
or robotics (Brooks, 1991), where it is necessary to integrate
perceptive, planning, and motor systems. This has forced
researchers to be more rigorous in the language that describes
the possible discrepancy between situated cognition and
cognitive psychology or, in artificial intelligence, between
the stance of situated cognition and the symbolic viewpoint. 
From this point of view, the main contribution of situated
cognition could be summed up as follows: Cognition cannot
be explained in terms of a representational model in which
the contents are independent of the context. In principle,
this statement does not seem to challenge the theories of
learning proceeding from cognitive psychology. However,
two possible standpoints have derived from this statement:
one that could be considered weaker and another, more
radical, one. The weaker view states that the inferences of
a symbolic model that interacts with the environment, on
the one hand, are strongly determined and controlled by the
environment and, on the other, they must be susceptible to
change by inputs coming from the environment. That is, the
use of knowledge in a certain context significantly changes
that knowledge. This statement does not challenge the
psychological theories of learning either. 
However, the radical position goes further when
establishing that the influence of the environment is so great
that the functioning of the human mind should be explained
in terms of a purely reactive system—similar to the one
conceived by some primitive behaviorists—that interacts
directly with the environment without resorting to possible
symbolic descriptions that already existed in the system.
The radical stance is incompatible with the analyses of
learning from cognitive psychology. That is, from this
viewpoint, the analyses based on the hypothesis that the
mind can be conceptualized as a physical system of symbols
are directly rejected. This radical view of situated cognition
is at least questionable, if not decidedly mistaken. For Vera
and Simon (1993), the hypothesis of the physical system of
symbols has been a fruitful paradigm in which cognitive
psychology has allowed the experts to reveal many behaviors
and, in artificial intelligence, to reproduce these same
behaviors. In contrast, if the viewpoint of the radical stance
is adopted, one cannot know with any certainty what
predictions can be made and which experiments to carry
out. That is, according to Vera and Simon, the series of
hypotheses that make up the radical stance is indefeasible
and, consequently, should be classified as unscientific. 
In contrast to the radical stance, what we have called
the weak standpoint is compatible with the analyses of
cognitive psychology, as long as they do not try to make
some hasty transfers from one field to another. A careful
scrutiny is necessary to determine precisely what situated
cognition contributes to the psychological theories of
learning. Regarding this problem, cognitive psychology has
not rewarded situated cognition theoreticians’ diligence in
reaffirming their stance by paying attention to situated
cognition. In fact, cognitive psychologists have acted rather
indifferent toward situated cognition.
Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1996) are an exception to
this tendency. They have made an effort to determine precisely
which vindications of situated cognition regarding learning
might be far from those of cognitive psychology. They reached
the conclusion that these vindications are not based on the
available experimental data and, in some cases, they contradict
these data. Precisely, this lack of scientific foundation of some
of the excesses of situated cognition is what allows it to assign
itself the role of the alternative to cognitive psychology. 
It should be noted that Anderson et al.’s (1996)
considerations refer to the learning that takes place in
teaching, which is the main field of the digressions of
situated cognition. Moreover, in the field of teaching,
teaching mathematics is emphasized because this is the area
(for reasons too lengthy to go into) where situated cognition
has performed most of its analyses. 
We would like to point out the importance for situated
cognition of the contextualization of learning, derived from
the need for learning to make sense, and not from a previous
reflection about the nature of learning processes. This
reflection is subsequent and, as it is strongly inspired by the
former problem, it leads to some obviously unfocused
generalizations. What could be considered the achievements
of situated cognition are also the origin of its difficulties
when attempting to transfer its analyses to the field of
learning. 
There is an additional problem. The possibility that
learning takes place in the most realistic context has certain
limits. In education, it is not always possible to achieve the
desirable degree of realism. On the other hand, some skills
cannot be acquired in exactly the same situation in which
they will ultimately be used. For example, think of the
amount of airplanes that would crash if pilots had to learn
to fly by actually piloting airplanes. Furthermore, learning
certain skills requires the prior mastery of a general basic
declarative knowledge that allows one to solve problems
and to acquire procedures. All this poses the problem of the
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generalization of learning some materials to other materials,
learning transfer, and the translation of declarative knowledge
to procedural knowledge. The value of a theory of learning
is probably to be found here and it is just this type of
research that blocks the conceptions of situated learning. 
To come back to Anderson et al.’s (1996) detailed
analysis, these authors sum up the main vindications of
situated learning and conclude that none of these vindications
in justified by the available experimental data, or they are
contrary to these data. According to Anderson et al., the
following four main vindications of situated cognition about
learning could be contrary to cognitive psychology: (a) action
is strongly grounded in the concrete situation in which it
takes place, so that knowledge is specific to the specific
situation in which the task is performed and, therefore, more
general knowledge cannot be transferred to real life
situations; (b) there is no transfer of knowledge acquired in
the course of performing a task, which would facilitate
learning another task; (c) teaching that is usually called
theoretical and that refers to teaching abstract contents is
not very efficient; (d) teaching must be provided in complex
social environments in which a rich social interaction is
produced that leads to learning between peers. 
Naturally, situated cognition agrees with many other
extremes that have been extensively studied in psychology,
but the issue is to discover where the discrepancy lies, and
the analysis outline of Anderson et al. (1996) seems correct
to us. Therefore, we are going to use this outline to analyze
the possible contributions of situated cognition. 
Regarding the fact that action is closely related to the
concrete situation in which it takes place and, therefore,
learning is somewhat context-specific, is no problem for the
explanations of learning provided by psychology. It is quite
another thing to say (as situated cognition exaggerates) that
all learning is context-specific and that more general
knowledge lacks virtuality. This is like saying that we should
not teach children how to multiply or that we should teach
them to multiply in several different ways that happen in
real life, and which might occur to us. It is not certain that
our imagination would be able to anticipate all the possible
real situations in which people might need to multiply
throughout their lives, and, therefore, if general knowledge
lacks virtuality, then we should probably not teach children
how to multiply at school. 
However, it is noted that, according to the study of
Carraher et al. (1985), mentioned above, the street children
from Brazil correctly calculate the cost of their sales and
the change they should give the buyers, but they are
incapable of solving arithmetic problems of similar difficulty
at school. In our opinion, psychology can account for this
phenomenon without resorting to arguments based on social
interaction mechanisms. One possibility is that, at school,
children are taught certain calculus algorithms and have
pencil and paper at their disposal. The street children,
however, not having pencil or paper, must employ different
algorithms to optimize the capacity of their working memory,
where they must mentally store the numbers to be calculated.
Thus, street children may not master the algorithms required
at school and hence, their failure to solve arithmetic problems
that they easily solve in the street. 
Perhaps, at school children should be taught to carry out
mental calculus without the aid of pencil and paper, in which
case, the children would probably have to make less effort
than that required to learn the same thing on the streets. It
is also possible that the children are more motivated on the
streets than at school, so the additional effort they have to
make on the streets goes unnoticed. However, it is not clear
whether the algorithms learned this way are more useable
than the traditional ones based on the use of pencil and
paper. In any case, the study of Carraher et al. (1985) is a
demonstration that some skills acquired out of school do
not generalize to school, but it does not demonstrate that
what is learned at school is never generalizable to real life
problems. That is, it does not demonstrate, for example, that
the arithmetic procedures learned at school will not be used
later on by clerks in their transactions or by citizens in
general when filing their income tax. 
Lave’s (1988) study about the behavior of supermarket
clients shows that the skills learned in the school context
may not transfer to some real life contexts. Probably, as we
have seen, for the same reasons that some skills learned in
real life do not transfer to school. However, there are some
very important skills, such as reading, than transfer from
one context to another with no difficulty. Furthermore, in
students, not reading in their daily lives is a determinant
factor of not mastering, or of reducing, their reading skills.
This is one of the most extensively mentioned causes of so-
called academic failure. 
The context is certainly a determinant of learning but,
if we wish to examine this in depth, we would have to start
out by defining the context we refer to. Ceci and Roazzi
(1994), for example, distinguish between a mental context,
a physical context, and a social context. Although there is
a strong interrelation between these three contexts, a rigorous
theory of the consequences of the context on learning should
clarify how each of these three contexts affects learning and
how they are interrelated. According to Ceci and Roazzi,
the context causes some knowledge structures, and not
others, to become activated; it also makes a person carry
out certain strategies that have been carried out in similar
contexts at other times; and, lastly, it affects the subject’s
interpretation of the task itself. 
There is no magic in the way the context affects learning.
The effect of these three types of context has been
extensively studied in psychology. In general, the context,
whether it be mental, physical, or social, predisposes people
towards a certain kind of mental operations, so that the
elaborations made in one context are different from those
made in another. In psychology of memory, for example,
the coding specificity principle establishes that reinstatement
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of the context in which the coding took place determines
recovery of the information to be recalled. Let us imagine
that a person studies the word piano preceded by—that is,
in the context of—the word heavy. The person should
subsequently recall it either with the aid of the word music
or the word heavy. As has been demonstrated ad nauseum,
the presence of a retrieval cue in the memory test that allows
subjects to retrieve the context in which they studied the
word determines their ability to recall the word in question. 
Thus, it is not a point of whether the context is more or
less determinant, but of establishing the virtuality of more
general knowledge, relatively independent of the context.
In this field, there are many data that show how the process
of decontextualization of knowledge determines whether it
can be used in different situations. In fact, if one learns
something in only one context, the material learned is closely
linked to that context, whereas if one learns in various
contexts, there is more generalization. Regarding an obvious
case, the potential of general knowledge lies precisely in
the fact that people can use their knowledge of, for example,
tables without having to resort to the context in which they
had their first experience with a table or to the various
contexts in which they had experiences with tables. 
With regard to the second vindication of situated
cognition about the lack of transfer of knowledge when
learning different tasks, although the two phenomena are
related, one thing is the transfer between contexts and
another, quite different, the transfer between tasks. If one
considers the second point, the large volume of research
carried out on this topic in psychology shows that there is
transfer in some cases and not in others. Precisely, one of
the big problems addressed by the psychological learning
theories is learning transfer, and this is one of the greatest
services that learning theories can offer to education, because,
ultimately, education should be good for living. Although
some very old studies were carried out in which transfer or
lack of transfer was demonstrated in various situations, as
current learning theories developed, this type of problem
could be analyzed more specifically. In this sense, the main
idea is that we are currently in a position to describe the
learning processes with a considerable amount of detail and
to analyze task components, so that we can identify the
cognitive elements that intervene in learning. 
Briefly, according to VanLehn (1989), there are currently
two important approaches to learning transfer. The first is
known as the identical elements theory (Kieras & Bovair,
1986; Kieras & Polson, 1985; Singley & Anderson, 1985,
1989), and the second is based on the overlapping of
semantic networks (Gentner, 1989; Holyoak, 1985).
Regarding the first approach, the idea is that transfer is
produced as a result of the coincidence of identical cognitive
units. For example, Singley and Anderson have shown that
subjects who have been trained in the use of a word
processor learn more quickly how to use a second, different,
processor and the degree of the first training transfer to the
second is directly proportionate to the number of procedural
elements shared by both word processors. 
The second approach is about knowledge representation
in semantic networks, so that transfer takes place by the
amount of overlapping of the diverse networks. This
mechanism has to do with analogical learning mechanisms.
The two theories can be considered compatible hypotheses
that analyze the phenomenon at different levels of analysis.
The identical elements theory counts the number of units
transferred, whereas the mapping theories attempt to explain
exactly which parts of an element are transferred. 
Regarding the fact that training in abstract is not efficient,
this viewpoint of situated cognition derives from the idea
that teaching should use procedures similar to those that take
place in traditional training, defined by the teacher-learner
relation. As mentioned, for Lave (1988), in this kind of
training, the same kind of learning takes place as that which
occurs in people’s normal life. In this case, the problem also
seems to become somewhat hazy as a result of reducing the
learning problem to an issue of the contextualization of
learning, which, no matter how important it is in teaching,
theoretically speaking, is not the only factor to consider in
a comprehensive learning theory. Although this is not the
place to analyze this problem in depth, a learning theory
must explain the function and the opportunity of what is
commonly called theoretical teaching. It is generally agreed
that the most efficient kind of teaching is that which combines
abstract teaching with the study of cases and concrete
examples. For Anderson et al. (1996), sometimes when real
life problems are introduced, for example, to lend context
to the study of algebra, a lot of time is wasted on secondary
tasks such as making tables and charts instead of dedicating
it to relating algebraic expressions to real life situations. 
Regarding the learning that should take place in complex
social environments, it can be considered a somewhat
simplified adaptation of the analyses of learning by situated
cognition. Data has indeed been obtained that show that
sometimes, group learning is more efficient than individual
learning. The point is that at other times, learning must be
individual. Anderson et al. (1996) point out that in team
sports or in orchestras, much more time is spent on
individual than on collective practice, although both are
necessary. But why is group learning efficient in some
circumstances and individual learning in others? The answer
to this question is only possible with the aid of a learning
theory. The only specific analysis of situated cognition is
the reference to learning between peers in the zone of
proximal development, but this analysis is too general and
is insufficient to adequately design an efficient situation for
group learning. Imagine an alternative explanation, derived
from the nature of procedural learning, according to which,
at some stages of procedural learning, subjects are more
aware of what they must do; that is, knowledge is less
proceduralized and therefore, less automaticized. At this
stage, it is easier to state explicitly what must be learned
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and therefore, the interaction between people who are in the
course of acquiring procedural knowledge is more efficient
than the interaction between someone who does not know
and someone whose knowledge is very automaticized. 
Greeno (1997) responded to these criticisms of Anderson
et al. (1996) about the insufficient basis of what could be
considered the alternative of situated learning to the cognitive
theories of learning. As could be expected in view of the
fact that the positions are ill defined, his answer focuses on
the fact that Anderson et al. first caricaturize the stance of
situated cognition and then aim their criticisms at that
caricature. Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1997) respond that
they are not referring to situated cognition, but to the possible
contributions of situated cognition to learning. That is, they
are not criticizing the analyses, which may be accurate, of
situated cognition, for example, of the problem of the sense
of human action. The important thing is to know what
situated cognition contributes to a theory of learning, which
is the topic of this article.
Without going into a detailed analysis of this interesting
polemic, the issue is no longer whether some alternative
learning theory to those of cognitive psychology derives
from situated cognition, as this possibility has been discarded.
Rather, the issue is to know how analyses at the level of
interactive systems can contribute to analyses at the level
of individual learning or vice versa. Vera and Simon (1993)
believe that, in the current state of affairs of our knowledge,
only a bottom-up contribution would make any sense, that
is, from cognitive psychology and its corresponding analyses
of individual learning to situated cognition. 
In contrast, Greeno (1998) suggests three fields from
which situated cognition could contribute to the enhancement
of ideas that make up the theories of learning. In our opinion,
this contribution is still not clear. In the first place, Greeno
mentions the definition of the problem space. Starting with
Newell and Simon (1972), the idea is that in the process of
solving problems, the first step is to delimit the problem
space. According to Greeno, the cognitive psychology theories
have been developed based on the assumption of well defined
problems. However, in real life, problems are usually ill
defined because of the multiplicity of factors that intervene.
This leads to the emergence of significant aspects of the
problem in the course of problem-solving behavior. That is,
when the environment in which the problem is posed is
dynamic, new goals crop up that lead to new solution criteria,
which, in turn, require new operators to reduce the distance
between the initial and the goal state. With regard to this
point, the contribution of situated cognition is not clear. The
preceding analyses of situated cognition could improve the
delimitation of problems or, perhaps, could force cognitive
psychology to develop more complex theories to account for
problem-solving strategies when problems are ill defined or
when problems become more complex in the course of their
solution. Situated cognition does not seem to have contributed
anything of relevance in these three cases.
Second, Greeno (1998) mentions the problem of
constructing meaning. According to this author, most studies
carried out in cognitive psychology in this area refer to text
comprehension, where reading activities are performed in
a stable environment, but real life comprehension processes
are performed in dynamic settings where meaning is the
result of a negotiation strongly determined by the context.
Although Greeno himself acknowledges the possibility of
performing cognitive analyses of this type of problems along
the lines of what has been done, however, he cautions about
the need for more complex analyses “especially when the
relevant context is constructed dynamically in conversations
that are taking place and in problematic aspects of activity”
(p. 5). Once again, while we agree about the complexity of
the problem of constructing meaning, we do not see how
situated cognition contributes to its solution. 
Third, Greeno (1998) refers to the question of people’s
goals when they are generated in the course of activities
and how they contribute to group functioning. This is
certainly a very important problem and its consideration
may add to the progress of motivational theories. However,
from our perspective, the relation between this type of
problems and a learning theory is rather distant. Again, this
kind of vindication of situated cognition may be fruitful to
analyze educational problems, but it involves the risk of
mistaking a learning theory for a motivational theory. In
fact, as mentioned, it is not clear that situated cognition
has contributed to the solution of the problem of the
meaning of teaching, for which it is supposedly prepared.
Situated cognition should probably approach this problem
more in detail and abandon, at least for the time being, its
ambition to become an alternative to psychological learning
theories. 
To conclude, one could say that only when situated
cognition carries its viewpoints to an extreme can it provide
alternative explanations to those of psychology. The trouble
with these explanations is that they have no scientific
foundation and, in the majority of cases, are completely
contrary to the available data. It is precisely this lack of
scientific foundation that allows it to collide with psychology.
In contrast, when situated cognition adopts more moderate
viewpoints, it is difficult to know what it really contributes
to the explanations of learning provided by psychology that
was not already known even before this type of analysis
proceeding from situated cognition appeared. 
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